Tag Archives: Insolvency

The business of life Chapter 37 – the joy of closure

Assembled in a meeting room in a hotel close to Newcastle airport early one morning, the two sides eyed each other warily.  We had not met for three years but had fought with all the powers of the law on our side and what had seemed like pure obduracy & guile on our opponents’ part.  It appeared that Clifford had convinced himself that our legal claims would melt away as we failed in the business his father had founded all those years before.The business of life - chapter 37

The plenary session began with both sides facing each other either side of a long table with the law society facilitators at either end.  Both sides had legal teams present comprising lawyers and barristers, all enjoying huge hourly fees whatever the outcome.  The process of spelling out our claim in great detail and at length whilst staring Clifford in the eye was a strange experience indeed.  It was exceeded only by having to listen to what we felt constituted the fairy tale of their defence and counter claim.  The plenary session over we retired to our respective rooms and the shuttle diplomacy began.  The chairman visited each party in turn to ascertain at first hand the reaction each group had to the others’ position.

It was clear that no quick or easy solution was likely to emerge, in fact it seemed that Clifford and Mike were as resistant to a settlement as ever.  Day turned into evening with no progress at all and the session broke up with each group making its own arrangements for dinner.  The next day began and continued all morning with no progress.  I was becoming increasingly irritated by the corporate finance partner from our law firm who could only match the other side’s bluster and seemed intent on ensuring that we ended up in court.  In contrast, Stephanie his manager who had worked closely with me over the previous three years impressed me greatly with her calm efforts to find a solution.

The day wore on in like fashion and Roger, Malcolm and I were becoming resigned to having to endure the costs and uncertainty of resolution before a judge.  I had been casually intrigued by the behaviour of our barrister who for the last hour or so had been ignoring the rest of us and quietly doodling on his pad (or so I assumed).  “OK,” he suddenly exclaimed, “this is how I see things.”  He then proceeded to share his doodles with us, which were actually a matrix of all of the claims and counter claims at stake.  Ranged against each claim was a percentage calculation of the chances of each party winning or losing with his best estimate of the awards and costs each would incur should they win or lose.

The bottom line was the view that we had an almost 100% chance of winning all of our claims.  His view was that Clifford had, at best, only a 50% chance of winning their counter claim.  However, the killer result was that the costs and damages Clifford would suffer as a result of our wins would exceed any benefit from his counter claim succeeding by a factor of about ten.  We called in the chairman who quietly listened, asked a few questions and departed to put this picture before Clifford and Mike.   An hour later he returned and we learned that they had capitulated almost completely.  A couple more hours later we all signed the necessary documents that drew matters to a close (apart from some remaining issues that festered on with HMRC).

As I drove back to Yorkshire that night I reflected on what had happened over the last three years.  Many years previously Clifford and Mike had put in train a course of action that was relatively insignificant at the time but one that had snowballed into major proportions.  I felt it was sheer arrogance and mindless bravado that had brought Clifford into conflict with us, a process that set about unravelling their plan & compounding matters through their refusal to negotiate.  It was clear that Clifford and Mike’s legal team had failed to advise them of the costs they could incur by their actions.  We had won a long, drawn out and bloody battle that had never been of our choosing and had won handsomely.  Strangely, it gave me little satisfaction other than great relief that the whole sad story was over.  I had closure.

Freed of the efforts and frustrations of a long and drawn out legal fight, we threw ourselves back into the challenges of improving our complex new group of three companies.  MSG was our strategic acquisition, the core of our business with, we believed, great potential for highly profitable growth and an ultimate sale.  By the standards of the UK engineering sector it was already a highly successful business (not least due to its non-involvement in the mainstream automotive sector, one we steadfastly ignored).  It had a potential to become even more profitable through an ability to offer unique solutions to demanding blue-chip customers.  We knew that it would take hard work and patience owing to the extremely long leads times required to replace an existing process.  In the case of one of the major customers we won, it took fully ten years.

Trisk and Bison were more tactical (and certainly opportunistic) acquisitions.  Both produced exceptional profits in the first year of our ownership.  If we had then put both businesses up for sale life would have become a lot simpler (a lot sooner).  However, buoyed by the wondrous sound of cash hitting the bottom of the piggy bank and improving PEI’s balance sheet, we pressed on certain that we had hit the magic formula.  From then on matters got infinitely more complex as the cash production machine slowed.

There are long, frustrating stories behind our ownership of both these businesses but I’ll restrict myself to the following brief accounts.

A common feature of both businesses was the quality of management and many of the staff we inherited (courtesy of TUPE).  In both cases, instead of their embracing the change and opportunity brought by new ownership, we had to spend too much time fighting a tendency to revert to the orthodoxies that drove them into administration in the first place.  It was almost as if they believed their failed businesses had been pursuing the correct strategy and policies all along and some freak external event had knocked them temporarily off course.  These tendencies were bad enough but the net effect was to divert our attention from MSG where, with hindsight, we should have concentrated our time and energies.

With Bison, it only took a parting with the MD (son of the CEO of failed parent PLC) and four short years to sell the business in 2003.  We heaved a sigh of relief and moved on.

The situation with Trisk was much more complex.  The company still had technical leadership in infra red paint curing and had also developed ultra violet technology for more demanding applications.  The business was certainly a world leader in its sector and exported to every continent across the globe.  Once we had taken over we saw that Trisk had a number of critical strategic issues.  A major market for Trisk had been the USA where we had a network of commission agents.  Our products were capable of commanding far higher price levels but the agents had learned to sit on their hands ahead of the peak winter demand until our locally based manager panicked and reduced prices.  This was a pattern that revealed itself to be a major problem in many parts of the world.  Attempting to establish a stable and rational pricing strategy proved to be particularly tough due to internal company politics and the weak MD we had inherited with the business.

The other major problem took several years to emerge as the Trisk management either weren’t aware of the shifting dynamics of their marketplace or they ensured that they wouldn’t reveal what they knew (knowing it would require them to change strategy completely).  Trisk had built its initial success on designing and selling IR paint curing systems almost exclusively used for automotive repair work.  These systems were based around an array of IR lamps mounted on relatively simple mobile stands that could be moved around car repair workshops.  Trisk had also adapted the concepts into larger arrays built into custom spray booths.  A major market shift began to make itself felt in the first couple of years following our acquisition.

Legislation was driving the introduction of health and safety and other environmental regulations and these were killing off small repair shops, consolidating the market towards larger and more efficient units.  As this trend continued (fuelled by a succession of mild winters) sales of Trisk’s traditional mobile units declined.  The problem, that took some time to emerge, was that we were not gaining the share of in-booth systems that we should have been achieving.  Booth manufacturers were being involved at the design stage of the new super car repair shops permitting them to specify whose paint curing system was installed.  By the time Trisk personnel got to know about a new repair centre it was already up and running with a competitor’s curing system installed with the booths.

It was clear that Trisk management and sales staff had simply been unaware of this key shift in market dynamics.  Or worse, they had chosen to keep doing what they always did (in their comfort zone) in the hope that it might bring about a return to the glory days.  Around the time that this strategic market shift was becoming apparent, our MD, Tom, came to us with a request to buy the company out from us.  Tired of the short-sighted and intransigent management at Trisk and a need to re-focus our attention back upon MSG, we agreed.  What followed was a disaster that we should have foreseen.  Tom took many months getting funding and putting his bid together during which time he clearly neglected the company.  The bid he put to us ultimately was derisory, was duly rejected and he departed shortly afterwards.

Roger and I became more closely involved in running the business and the strategic issues began to surface.  Trisk’s real expertise lay in the technology of curing paint quickly and effectively and it was a world leader in this field.  The actual delivery systems were secondary but it was vital that Trisk became involved in ensuring their systems were specified at the design stage of the spray booths.  We recruited a marketing manager to research the market, promote and co-ordinate the use of Trisk technology into booths.

We also looked to see where else the technology could be most effectively employed.  It didn’t take long to discover that the servicing and repair of commercial aircraft was a potentially hugely profitable sector.  The leading edges of wings and tailfins had to be resprayed on a scheduled basis but the paint curing systems used were slow and expensive.  Trisk’s solution could eliminate days of aircraft downtime saving thousands of pounds for the operators.  With these two strategies in place, we employed an aerospace expert and a new managing director.

Sadly, our new MD transpired (despite an apparently strong CV and significant technical qualifications) to be completely ineffective and I had the task once more of seeing an MD off the premises.  It became clear that the sales and marketing team were not being successful in either ensuring specification of Trisk technology into new booth installations nor were they taking the action we had agreed to improve pricing.  Despite diverting major time on the part of our local MSG US manager towards assisting Trisk, the distribution problems there remained.  The fledgling aerospace business was still struggling to break through and gain aerospace approvals.  Our aerospace manager resigned taking up a more mainstream role in the sector.  Despite investing huge amounts of our time the team never seemed to have their heart in stepping out of their comfort zone and taking the necessary action that would turn the business around.

Looking back, Roger and I had believed in the business and had pushed hard to effect the changes that we believed would turn its fortunes around.  Our experience once more had been of ineffective management that we had inherited (and subsequently employed).  Buying both Bison and Trisk had stretched our management capabilities to the limit.  I still believe that we could have made a success of Trisk had we been able to concentrate solely on that business.  Both businesses had initially contributed strongly but we should have sold both within a year.

Although 3i had never overtly pressured us to sell PEI we did experience attempts at ‘persuasion’ occasionally and around this time a fresh ‘persuasion offensive’ was made.  Roger, Malcolm and I discussed the situation and decided that we would put the entire PEI business up for sale.  MSG had been performing well, our debt had been significantly reduced and we would be glad to see the end of Trisk.

Could we find a buyer for the whole business?  Would we receive offers that would reflect the value we had built in MSG?

 Image courtesy of careers.guardian.co.uk

 

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The Business of Life Chapter 36 -it’s not just the business risks

Roger was taken seriously ill over the Christmas holiday 1998 and admitted to hospital with crippling back & chest pain.  Following MRI scans and blood tests he was diagnosed with an MRSA infection in his thoracic spine.  The affected vertebrae had all but collapsed, were partially fused, trapping nerves and were the cause of the excruciating pain he was suffering.  No one knew the source of the infection or how it came to lodge in his spine but it seemed life threatening at worst and incapacitating at best.  Whilst Roger was being pumped full of a cocktail of the most powerful antibiotics I pondered our situation. When it's not just the business you have to fear

 The illness could not have come at a worst time.  Our dispute with the vendors of MSG had reached the stage where a court action seemed inevitable and with the only certainty that we would be spending vast sums more to fuel the action.  I had been overseeing the detailed investigative work inside the company and liaising with our legal team.  I could ensure that our claims continued to be pursued with vigour but there was a peak of activity occurring simultaneously on a number of fronts.

A few months earlier one of our minor customers had been placed into administration.  The loss to MSG was small but the business itself was interesting.  The company concerned was Trisk, a world leader in infra red paint curing equipment for the automotive after market.  Situated only a few miles from us in Sunderland, it had enjoyed explosive growth with the founder recently receiving the accolade of North East Businessman of the Year award.  Unfortunately, a combination of poor strategy and uncontrolled spending had run the business into the ground resulting in the management being replaced and the bank appointing an administrator as soon as they had recovered their overdraft.

 The other aspect was that Trisk was also a 3i investment.  Although they had no hope of recovering their original investment they assured me that they would be supportive of an acquisition by us.  Prior to Christmas we had met with the administrators and the new management at the Trisk headquarters.  The new team had all been promoted from within and, whilst lacking experience, seemed supportive of our efforts to acquire the company.  However, there were a number of other parties interested including the largest competitor, Hedson of Sweden.  We were fully engaged in negotiations when Roger was taken ill.

Our efforts to locate at least one suitable acquisition candidate in our own engineering sector had come to nothing.  Having scoured our industry, had meetings with owners and analysed many sets of accounts, we came to the decision that there was not a competitor worth buying.  With the exception of a single piece of equipment (that we subsequently acquired for very little) none even had assets worth acquiring.  It was also quite clear that our competition fought with only one weapon – price.  They competed with each other for components that had always been made by the spinning process simply driving down price in the process.  The result was that margins in all of the competition were slender to non existent.

Following our strategic review we had identified that any new major business to be targeted would have to be conversion from alternative metal forming processes.  It was apparent to us that we could offer significant technical advantages for industrial applications where the risk of failure in life had to be eliminated.  This was a risk in particular (and demanding) applications where components had been made using alternative metal forming processes.  Companies were prepared to pay heavily for a process that eliminated these risks.  As the result of our new strategy, Roger had targeted the medical division of one of the largest industrial companies in the world.  Within hours of his contact they had put an engineer on a plane from the USA to meet with us.  Now, they had followed this up with drawings for a set of major components for one of their products.  The only person with the engineering skills to lead the investigation into how we could produce the components was Roger.

When I went into the hospital the following day to discuss how we might make alternative plans, I found I had been beaten to it.  Drawings were strewn across Roger’s bed and a small team were assembled around him.  “If I don’t do it, no other bugger can.” growled Roger in his inimitable manner.  He proceeded to lead the team that developed our ultimately successful solution from his hospital bed in the weeks that followed.  Samples were produced, shipped to the US and soon approved.  Unfortunately, despite our superior solution (and the winning of an internet auction) we fell foul of internal politics and it was to be several years before we became a regular supplier.

The infection that had laid Roger low was finally pronounced clear but it was to leave him with subsequent and recurrent problems that continue to this day.  Somehow he would shrug the problems off and battle on displaying a level of fortitude and perseverance I have never witnessed before or since.   It soon became apparent that to pursue these strategic opportunities required investment in new equipment that was capable of producing the power and tolerances required for the demanding, new work.  Over the next few years we acquired two of the largest CNC spinning lathes in Europe (capable of spinning components up to 5 metres in diameter).  These were followed by smaller state of the art spinning machines, water jet cutting, high speed plasma and a robot.

Our bid to acquire Trisk was successful, beating off our Swedish competitor.  Getting to know our new business and repositioning strategy proved to be a time consuming process.  However, we quickly had the business back into profit and started looking for fresh opportunities.

In another serendipitous turn of events we suffered a further minor bad debt when a second of our many MSG customers went into administration.  The company, Bison IBC Systems in Bradford, produced UN standard intermediate bulk containers for the transportation and storage of hazardous chemicals.  It was a leader in its field and had a strong reputation for quality.  However, once again we found a company that had been mismanaged, although this time it was through the activities of its parent company.  Following protracted negotiations we bought the assets of the business later in 1999.  A similar pattern occurred as with Trisk and profits started to flow shortly after our acquisition.

 By the end of that financial year both new acquisitions had made strong profits and, combined with our MSG business, we produced an extremely strong result for our holding company, Precision Engineering International (PEI) which we held jointly with 3i.  We now owned a portfolio of 3 industrial companies, each a leader in its sector.

Pleased with our track record, 3i positively encouraged further acquisition activities.  As a result I received a copy of their entire engineering and manufacturing portfolio (over 500 companies) together with an open invitation to consider any of these for acquisition.  Detailed investigation made clear a couple of things to me.  The first was that it was extremely satisfying to discover that we were one of their top performing investments in these sectors.  The other aspect was learning that they were quite amenable to turning over an investment with a fresh set of partners they considered could produce a higher return.  However, despite spending a great deal of time in further research and analysis there was no obvious target for us.  Shortly afterwards, another problem was sprung on us.

When I set up the funding to acquire MSG I had sat through a ‘beauty parade’ of banks (something that might reasonably be called an oxymoron).  The bank that offered the lowest lending rates and the most attractive deal was Allied Irish.  It seemed that they wanted to become involved in supporting VC backed deals and were anxious to become involved with 3i, hence their better than average offer.  All had gone well for several years although it was clear from various meetings that they knew little about manufacturing and less about engineering.  Nevertheless it was a shock when they turned up one day that year and said they were calling in their millions and we would have to refinance.  When pushed for a reason they claimed that they really didn’t understand our sector and were going to concentrate on property, a sector where they had real expertise.  Well, we all now know how that one worked out for them!

We refinanced easily with HSBC and that relationship worked well for a number of years with further lending to support our growing capital investment programme at MSG.  Until that is, they decided to replace their extremely knowledgeable regional director for someone who knew about as much about business as Allied Irish (perhaps less).

In 2000 another significant event took place.  Our claim against the vendors of MSG and our defence against their counterclaim had been consuming vast amounts of my time and we had already run up massive legal fees.  With all legal avenues exhausted, I had prepared for a full hearing with a brief to a very experienced barrister in London.  We were convinced we could win our case and this meeting reinforced that view.  The process had become more and more fraught as a result of constant rejection by the vendors of each and every attempt we made to resolve the matter and obstruction of our investigations.  It didn’t help that Clifford had a reputation as a blustering bully whose usual line of defence was attack.

Nevertheless, in one last attempt to avoid the additional time and expense of a trial we made a proposal to the vendors to join with us in the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) process.  To our great surprise we learned that they had agreed to this process.  The stakes were very high.  We had already sunk a large six figure sum into legal and investigative fees in the previous three years but there always has to be an element of risk and uncertainty in legal matters.  Even the ADR process didn’t come cheap with barristers in attendance on both sides.

 Some weeks later I sat across the table from Clifford with our respective teams ranged around us.  It was the first time we had met since we bought the business three years previously and in that time I heard he had suffered a stroke.  Would illness have mellowed him or would he be as obdurate as ever?  Could we reach a settlement and put an end to the vast drain on time and expense?  Or was this just a futile exercise?

Image courtesy of gastroenterologyupdate.com.au

The Business of Life Chapter 35 – when you can’t take no for an answer

ABC desperately needed to acquire a competitor.  If we didn’t then it was increasingly likely that we wouldn’t succeed in turning the business around and finding a buyer of our own.  We knew that acquisition of a suitable company offered us the only realistic opportunity to reduce the cost of sales, boost influence with major suppliers and make a step change in performance.  We also needed to acquire a competitor with distribution rights to certain ‘flagship’ brands.  We had a suitable and seemingly willing target but one huge problem remained; we had no money and no hope of raising any fresh capital. When you can't take no for an answer

The only option was to get the parent company of our target to fund our purchase.  Having worked for most of my career within very large organisations, I understood the type of pressures that can arise.  Someone in the organisation might be so personally desperate to offload their losses-making UK division that they might be prepared to find a way to finance our purchase.  So, having said we were interested at a much lower price than they wanted, we left them alone whilst they negotiated with a number of our other competitors.  No sale took place.

After about six months we approached them again with the following proposal; we would buy the customer list and the goodwill and pay for this out of a percentage of future gross profits over the next 3 years.  We required that they transfer the stock to us and we would pay for it as we sold it.  Any stock still unsold after 1 year, we could return.  They would make the entire workforce redundant and bear the cost themselves.  Finally they would retain the premises.  Following an agonising wait, they accepted our terms in their entirety.

We had assumed that only around 30% of their turnover would be retained but in the event we kept over 60%.  We also retained the distribution rights to the ‘flagship’ brands (having sounded out these suppliers in advance) and used these to grow our business significantly in our traditional accounts.  Over time we backed away from the poorer credit risk customers we had and replaced these with business grown from the higher quality new ones.

Our investment in stock settled down to a level not much higher than pre-acquisition despite the significantly increased turnover.  A key influence in this had been the previous identification that no one person in ABC (except Mike) had responsibility for the value of stock.  A product manager was appointed who, in addition to his responsibilities in managing the ranges, had responsibility for sales forecasting & absolute levels of stock.  With his efforts and skills, stock turns improved, our service levels got better & working capital requirements reduced.  We were often able to win business at regular prices because we were the only distributor with stock.

One of the most successful moves we made was to de-emphasise sales revenue.  In order to adapt to rapidly changing pricing levels amongst competition, it was essential to allow the sales team certain flexibility over day to day pricing.  The problem was that sales revenue was chased to the detriment of margins.  This was especially evident as every month end approached.  In an effort to remedy this we scrapped sales targets and moved to cash gross margin targets.  All access to sales figures was removed from the internal IT systems.  In our internal communications only cash margins were ever referred to from that point on.  The result was a steady improvement in margins that provided clear, additional profit.

Despite including some of the major global corporations (e.g. IBM) the behaviour of most suppliers was chaotic.  They lacked any evidence of a coherent strategy and seemed entirely reactive, capable only of using price as a variable.  We put together a detailed presentation that Mike then made to each of our suppliers.  In it we spelt out our analysis of the sector, our plans for the future and what we needed from our chosen suppliers.  We announced a supplier performance monitoring system together with an annual Supplier of the Year award.  Each month we shared the ratings of our suppliers across 25 pre-announced criteria.  The results were dramatic, with suppliers rapidly falling over each other to improve their ratings (and in so doing improving service to us).  Tangible support in terms of focussed co-operative promotional activity rose and with it our sales.  The year end saw a major one day event for all suppliers with awards given for the best in category and overall winner.  The programme cost us very little but grew in effectiveness each year.

Performance slowly improved and monthly profits started to be the norm.  Gradually, the losses on the balance sheet were being eliminated.  However, part way through this process one of the major customers was placed into administration owing us over £160k.  There was little hope of any recovery and most of the loss was uninsured.  We managed to cover the loss from the provisions we had built and a small insurance recovery.  The shock of this was severe though.  Strict new credit policies were put in place and the board agreed a new guideline that no single customer would be allowed to represent a greater exposure than a pre-set limit.  It was clear that we urgently needed to lift the quality of our customer base to continue building the business.  Many of the traditional customers were just too risky to allow the credit required to fund the extra volumes we required.

Priority then turned to improving the internal processes of the business and to improving profitability.  A range of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) was identified for the entire business with weekly & monthly monitoring agreed.  These became the dials we all watched on the dashboard & formed the language we all talked within the company.  A complete review of the financial systems was undertaken and tight new accounting controls were put into place.

A reorganisation of the internal sales structure was achieved that established a series of teams comprising a Field Sales Manager plus a Customer Service Executive and a Telesales Canvasser.  This restricted the number of expensive field sales heads & beefed up the proactive telesales’ prospecting & selling activities.  Grouping them into discrete teams gave a sense of identity & team spirit.  The increased communication achieved within the teams greatly assisted sales results.  Various techniques were tried in an effort to improve the rate of proactive sales calls.  Finally, the ‘quiet room’ concept was born where each prospector went into a spare office for number of hours per week & made calls from a direct outside line with no distractions.  The rate of new business rose.

That some sales people were much better than others soon became apparent.  We suspected that technique was the cause.  External sales trainers were brought in to overhaul our sales approach & re-train the entire sale steam in a revised selling model.  The sales team loved the process and learnt many new lessons, which they were quickly able to apply.  Mike decided not to replace the sales director but to run the sales force himself (which he did with great leadership & drive).  Mike had a natural ability to lift spirits in the team.  Following a particularly successful month Mike would declare a beer and pizza outing to celebrate.  If the business had an especially bad month, he didn’t rant and rave but declared a beer and pizza evening to put it behind them!

Freed of the German company, we were now making profitable inroads into Europe via a UK based sales effort.  Curiously, Hull proved to be a fertile source for staff with European language skills.  The business went on to make three straight years of good profits and the balance sheet continued to improve, building thereafter to achieve a very healthy net asset value.  Finally, the remodelling of the business was rounded off with a change of name to ABC Technology Distribution Ltd.

The bank had been patient during this period and had finally let us leave the ‘intensive care’ department.  Mark T had moved on within 3i and had been replaced with Ian with whom I built a close working relationship.  The relationship however maintained certain protocols one of the most important being that I never allowed a parallel reporting system to creep in.  We were fellow shareholders with common risks and common interest but all the key issues were reported formally.  There was however a great deal of pressure to achieve a sale and I was constantly keeping Ian up to date on our plans whilst shielding Mike from as much of this pressure as I could.

We did have a very clear plan for a sale however, one that was clearly understood by the board and was one that we carefully implemented.  Mike had known the CEO (Mike B) of a major US distributor, Scansource, for many years and had ‘borrowed’ many of their business practices and strategies.  Having closely followed Asda’s emulation of Walmart, which directly facilitated the eventual acquisition of Asda, Mike’s stated intention of selling out to Scansource made a lot of sense to me.  One significant problem had occurred though.  Having opened a competing business in what Mike B saw as his backyard, the relationship had soured.

Now that we had succeeded in extricating ourselves from the USA, Mike attempted a charm offensive designed to achieve a rapprochement with his erstwhile mentor.  The news that we might be ‘on the market’ to such an obvious buyer was duly conveyed.  This did not achieve the desired effect and it was with dismay that we learnt that Scansource were trawling Europe looking for acquisition candidates whilst ignoring ABC and Mike’s blandishments.  We had to battle on with improving the business with no other realistic purchaser in sight.

Finally, Scansource came knocking on our door and negotiations for a sale began.  After a long, drawn out and frustrating process we achieved a sale in May 2002 for a healthy sum that gave me and all the ordinary shareholders a good return on their investment.  Additionally, Andy and I received a healthy incentive payment from 3i that had been offered to us 5 years previously in the event that we achieved a recovery of their investment.  Mike stayed with the business but this didn’t last long as making the shift from owner to employee was never going to be an easy one.  He went on to form another business in a related field that has been extremely successful.  And, in a strange turn of fate, the Scansource European MD ended up working for me in an unrelated business I formed some years later.

The previous five years had never been easy, firstly with the challenges of keeping ABC afloat, then of making that vital acquisition and going on to achieve a satisfactory sale.  This had been taking place against major problems in my other investments.  It was though, and despite the many pressures, one of the most satisfying times of my career working with such a cohesive and successful team.

Elsewhere life was equally challenging, frustrating, commercially dangerous and rewarding.  I was getting used to it.

 Image courtesy of thepoliticalcarnival.net

The Business of Life Chapter 32 – when death becomes inevitable

 When death becomes inevitableWith Richard gone I appointed Tim as MD, we started the hunt for a finance director and commenced the process of producing a new business plan for the next twelve months.  However, we quickly discovered that, such was the mess in the accounting systems, it was not possible to establish the true working capital position.  Our auditors hired us the services of an experienced accountant who quickly set about the process of investigating the current state of the company’s books.  The management accounts transpired to not be worth the paper they had been printed on deemed more like a work of fiction.  Worse, the VAT was overdue and the VAT accounts had not been reconciled for months; indeed it looked as if they never could be. Whatever vestiges of empathy I had for Richard quickly evaporated.

With a twelve month plan completed, Tim and I presented this to our finance company to plead for additional time.  We then visited every one of our key suppliers to explain the current situation and to present our plans.  Luckily, we gained the full support of everyone.  Tim proceeded to do a remarkable job as the new MD, working tirelessly to rally the whole team, whilst I started the process of seeking a new finance director. With the aid of 3i, we met and appointed a very experienced FD who quickly set about bringing the company’s books up to the required standard.  With the correct information guiding us and the whole team working effectively, sales and margins slowly started to improve.

By mid year (our second) we were trading profitably but cash remained as tight as ever.  Further close examination revealed that our finance company were slowly but surely reeling in their loan by reducing their advances against our invoices.  It was galling in an extreme to realise that, had we not suffered the actions of the vendor and his illicit cash strip, we would have been in a healthy cash position with no liquidity concerns.  However, with Offhand (the vendor) again doing a disappearing act at my latest attempt to arrange a dispute resolution meeting, it was clear that we were running out of time before we had to go to court.  Although we were sure of the odds of winning on our main claim (the cash strip), there was unfortunately (due to the poor state of the books before our purchase) a degree of uncertainty over the smaller claim.  With the prospect of enormous legal bills even if we won the main claim, it was clear that drastic action was needed.  My first foray into business ownership looked like it could hit the rocks.

With the business trading in two entirely separate markets, with two different product ranges, it was apparent that potentially we could package one half of the business and sell this to a competitor.  One of the product ranges had lower margins and poorer quality debtors but had potentially a higher strategic value to competition.  With a range of cautious estimates for a sale price, it became clear that the rump business, operating with lower overheads, could prosper even without the reducing invoice discounting facility.

I initiated a series of discrete discussions with our competition for the more saleable business.  Out of the calls I made, two produced meetings that showed interest and I progressed these.  Further discussions led me to believe that we could achieve a price at the upper end of our estimates.  Nevertheless, whilst we were now trading profitably, we were far from being out of the woods in terms of liquidity and in this uncertain situation we lacked the cash to pursue the legal action.  I drove the long way back home that week convinced we could make the plan work.

Given the somewhat vague legal definition of insolvency, I wanted to be sure that we were on safe ground selling off company assets and sought specialist advice from one of the big four accountancy firms.  It transpired that to be certain that we were seen to be acting in the best interests of all the creditors, we needed to advise them of our plans and gain their agreement.  As I was returning from that meeting I received a call from one of the two interested parties advising me that they were withdrawing.  This robbed me of the opportunity to have two parties bidding against each other but all you need is one willing purchaser; so, press on.  When I got back to the office I found that sales in the previous month had failed to reach our projection.  Immediately, the finance company reduced advances against our invoices still further.

Good news came at last in the form of an encouraging offer for the part of the business we had put up for sale.  We only now needed to gain the agreement of our creditors to a new overall plan, realise the sale at the agreed sum and we were home and dry.  With the sale achieved, we would be able to pay off all overdue creditors and finance court proceedings against Offhand.  We carefully revised our rolling twelve month business plan and Tim & I started the arduous task of again travelling the country to meet with our creditors.  We presented the full story including a fall back position (if the sale failed or we did not receive the full backing of all creditors) of having to place the business into administration.  In the event, we achieved 100% acceptance of our plan.  This proved to be of no avail.

The hammer blow came several days later, when I received a call from the CEO of the competitor that had made the offer; he had heard of the precarious state of the overall business and was withdrawing his offer.  It subsequently transpired that the credit control manager of our largest supplier (who had pledged full support to me face to face) had revealed our situation to our competitor.  We discussed the situation as a board but there was no way out.  With the working capital financing now almost depleted (and soon to disappear completely) and no way of raising further finance to continue trading and fight our legal case, we had run out of road.  That same day I appointed the accountancy firm I had met as administrators and arranged to meet them at the office the following morning.

The next day I was relieved of my duties as an employee and director.  Tim was kept on for a few weeks more whilst the administrators tried to sell the business as a going concern.  The part of the business we had originally received a healthy offer for went as an asset sale for a fraction of that which it was worth immediately prior to the administration.  I lost a great deal of money and the creditors never received a penny.  Our wonderful administrators then managed to string the process out for ten long years taking all of the money they raised in their own fees.

Against the backdrop of this sad and frustrating failure, I was by this time also heavily committed in what was to become an even longer running and equally challenging saga in the other 3i investment where I was now chairman and part owner.  Whilst up in Newcastle, the Metal spinners investment was also becoming more challenging by the day.  Was it all going to end in a disaster?

The Business of Life Chapter 31 – the gathering storm

Having successfully acquired the Metal Spinners group of companies I was elated But the glow of post-deal euphoria was destined to be short-lived.  As I started the process of taking control of the businesses with Roger and Mark problems in the other companies were bubbling to the surface.   I shall be returning to the MSG experiences in due course but, meanwhile, there are other tales to tell. The Business of Life chapter 31 - the gathering storm   

 The failure rate of new businesses is high with around one third disappearing within their first three years.  But once through this initial period the rate of attrition falls and many businesses survive to have a long life, weathering even the odd recession.  Business risk is omnipresent but there is one circumstance where the greatest risk arises and that is when a new owner takes control.  Research has shown that the majority of acquisitions work to the benefit of the vendor’s shareholders.  There are many reasons for this phenomenon, including inappropriate strategy and culture being introduced and sometimes sheer incompetence on the part of the new management.  But the greatest problem for even the best new incoming owners, despite the most exhaustive due diligence, is that they simply don’t know where the bodies are buried.

Introduced by 3i to become investing chairman for the acquisition of the Bridgestream business (not its real name), I had become the third member of the buy-in team.  The impression I came away with my initial meetings was that the team leader (we’ll call him Richard) was a great guy; originally a chartered accountant from one of the major firms and well experienced in business.  Richard was charming & urbane and we hit it off at once.  The other team member, Tim, struck me as a solid and dependable man who would make a great operations director for the business.  There was the added advantage that they had both worked together previously on another 3i investment.

Bridgestream was, at the time, a privately owned service based business with a large distribution arm for the products it used.  I reserved judgement until I could carry out my own due diligence.  The following week I visited, met the owner and had a chance to look over the main premises.  Being after office hours I wasn’t able to meet any of the staff or get a feel for the atmosphere of the business while it was operating (confidentially concerns on the part of the owner had precluded a visit during normal hours).  I came away thinking, the premises are old, they had a neglected feel and I didn’t take to the owner (I’ll call him Offhand).

However, when I reported back to Mark T at 3i it seemed we shared the same view.  The business was not a particularly exciting one but the plan the team had tabled seemed realistic and we both shared a very favourable opinion of Richard.   Furthermore, it seemed that he came with a tremendous recommendation from the references that had been taken.  We agreed it would be a goer given a ceiling on the purchase price, a satisfactory funding package plus my role as chairman and the experience I could bring to the team.

Richard, Tim and I worked on a detailed reworking of the business plan whilst we awaited the financial due diligence from KPMG.  A series of meetings with banks and factoring companies resulted in finalisation of the funding package and my individual equity investment was settled.  I was surprised to learn just how large a cash stake Richard and Tim were putting up.  They had originally planned to complete the transaction without external equity participation but suffered when, being unable to finance the deal on that basis, they had revealed to 3i just how much they could scrape together (and that was then set in concrete).  The final element of the funding package was an element of vendor finance in the form of a deferred element of the total consideration.  The vendor haggled but finally conceded.

Shortly before completion, we met to receive the financial due diligence report.  There was good and bad news.  Whilst the overall level of company performance was confirmed, it seemed that the financial systems were not particularly robust.  There were two associated companies, only one of which we were purchasing (the distribution arm), the vendor retaining the service business.  The concern was that the accounting systems couldn’t be relied upon to always delineate between the two companies.  Richard undertook to work with the vendor to review the systems and finalise a working capital level for completion, which would then be guaranteed.

Negotiations over the sale and purchase agreement dragged on but we finally completed the transaction with everyone happy.  We were the new owners of Bridgestream (along with our VC equity partners 3i) of a distribution business with eight branches around the UK and two separate operating divisions.  For myself, I had made my first private equity investment.  However, even as we sipped our champagne and accepted the congratulations of our advisers, the storm clouds were gathering.

With the glow of success (or it might have been champagne) still infusing our faces the following morning, we took control of the business and set about reviewing our new company.  Bridgestream traded from eight warehouses across the Midlands and Southern England, supplying a wide range of chemical and consumable products into two discrete industrial markets.  The business was trading profitably (albeit on narrow margins) but had high overheads in terms of both premises and staff.  Our business plan included achieving major savings by consolidating down onto a single site; this would also have the advantage of operating with reduced inventory whilst improving customer service.  During the remainder of the first week, I visited most of the sites, which served to confirm the urgency of the plan.

The first bombshell came with my return to the office to find an extremely concerned looking Richard in his office with the management accountant.  “ We’ve been screwed.” Richard announced to me.  In contravention of the terms of the sale and purchase agreement the vendor had cancelled all of the previous month’s payments to creditors.  The effect of this was to deprive Bridgestream of the major portion of the working capital we had relied upon.  I agreed with Richard that an overhaul of the accounting systems was vital if we were to have accurate information.

The situation was compounded when we also discovered a few days later that in settling an intercompany debt pre-completion between Bridgestream and its sister company (remaining with Offhand), a large over-payment had been made.  The net effect was now a hole in our working capital of well over half a million pounds.  This was a situation that moved us from being seriously injured to virtually crippled.  Richard quickly spoke to Offhand who made soothing noises over the matter and promised to look into the situation.  We hastily re-ran our cashflow projections and calculated that, with changes to our payment terms and some savings we could make we might survive; but we needed that cash.  Now.  The next call was to our lawyers.

Despite many calls to Offhand, no payment was forthcoming, so on our lawyers’ advice, we instituted proceedings against him for breach of contract.  Offhand’s reaction was to issue a counterclaim claiming repayment of the deferred consideration.  As the months dragged on I attempted to engage Offhand in an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) process but despite agreeing he never showed up for a meeting.  One of our managers still in contact with Offhand reported that he had no intention of paying as he believed we couldn’t afford the legal costs to win our action.  The legal processes rolled on and our costs duly rose.

Meanwhile, the cash situation was not improving.  We were surviving but barely and the prospects of a new loan to compensate were zero.  Towards the end of that first year, the directors all agreed to reduced salaries.  Richard had previously agreed to replace the management accountant (we had acquired with the business) as he was, in Richard’s own opinion, simply not up to the job.  The months dragged on but no change took place, Richard always having one excuse after another to delay making a change.  It also became apparent that our invoice financing company were reducing their advances to us, having the effect of stressing our finances still further.  A meeting with their management revealed their concerns over the credit worthiness of many of our customers.  Richard promised a major drive to improve debt collection.

Richard had started giving me growing cause for concern over this period.  He was increasingly absent from the office, ostensibly improving sales but instead he frequently met with one ‘snake oil salesman’ after another and came back full of his latest ideas for additional (and wholly inappropriate) new product lines.   The monthly accounts were increasingly late for our board meetings and appeared to be showing profits whilst we were bleeding cash.  After another board meeting when we were again without full accounts, I called off the meeting and met alone with Richard.  What followed were, hopefully, the most difficult couple of hours of his life.  I covered all of his shortcomings, his continued failings to take corrective action despite commitments, inappropriate sense of priorities and his duties as a director and informed him I required a programme of specific actions over the next month (through to our first year end).

Over the next couple of months we set about the site consolidation process.  We finally found suitable premises, close to the centre of the country and the motorway network and, after careful planning on Tim’s part, we made the move over one hectic, weekend.  The long awaited reduction in stock levels finally started showing benefits and along with the staffing reductions our overheads would come down (after the effects of the redundancy payments had fed through).

Yet another turn of the screw came when the financing company rewarded our stock reduction programme with a corresponding reduction in their advance.  The promised sales improvement failed to materialise and combined with our reduction in stock financing we were seeing no improvement in cashflow.  Richard was pleading the need to concentrate on finalising our year end accounts (which we were under pressure to produce) and had still not replaced the management accountant (saying now that he had great loyalty).  I was forced to give him additional time to achieve the commitments he had made to me.  Richard shortly afterwards produced management accounts showing a break-even position at the year end.  He also promised that the cash situation would quickly improve and that, now the move was complete, we would see real benefits.

Some weeks later my mobile rang with a devastating call from our major supplier.  I learnt in a very difficult conversation that Richard had reneged on a previously agreed payment schedule and was now avoiding calls.  He informed me that all confidence in Richard was exhausted and was going to close the account.  I promised immediate attention to the issue and asked, on my personal surety, for additional time to resolve matters.  By this time I had also gone many months without payment of salary and other business expenses I had incurred.  The following day I was due to meet with Richard and Tim at KPMG’s offices for the audit meeting, so I decided to delay any conversation until we could meet face to face.

The information from our audit partner was worse than I could have imagined.  The year-end break-even result Richard had reported (critical to the continued support of our financing company) was in fact a very large loss.  Furthermore, we were informed that the firm had never seen an accounting system in such a mess.  Richard bumbled on making a series of ludicrous excuses whilst I sat and tried to configure a plan.  The first step had to be to remove Richard; not only was he past the point at which he could recover any credibility, it was clear that he was utterly incompetent.  I made suitable excuses and left to start moving things forward.

 My first action was to meet with our VC partner to bring him up to speed and gain his agreement to the action I was proposing.  I then had a meeting with our lawyers to review the terms of Richard’s contract.  They agreed that the situation constituted a serious enough breech of his duties to warrant dismissal without compensation.  That left the issue of Richard’s equity, which was literally under water and without value.  Under the terms of his contract if he left the company he was required to sell the equity back to the company at an agreed valuation.  In an act of generosity I set a valuation at a nominal sum.  I called Richard and set up an extraordinary board meeting for a couple of day’s time.

What followed was the hardest task I have ever had to undertake in business.  It had fallen to me to fire more than a few people in my time but to take away someone’s dreams and their life’s savings at the same time was not something to relish.  In the event a usually verbose Richard was stunned into silence save for a few monosyllabic replies.  I escorted him whilst he cleared his office and saw him off the premises.  Later that night he returned blind drunk and hurled two pallets through the front office windows.  The exercise of power can be a sobering experience.

Could we save the business?  

 Image courtesy of viralblog.com

 

When the Perfect Storm hits (part 3 The aftermath)

With Richard gone I appointed Tim as MD, we started the hunt for a finance director and commenced the process of forecasting the next twelve months ahead.  We quickly discovered that, such was the mess, it was not possible to establish the true working capital position.  Our auditors hired us the services of an experienced accountant who quickly set about the process of investigating the current state of the company’s books. The management accounts were not worth the paper they had been printed on and, worse, the VAT had not been reconciled for months. Whatever vestiges of empathy I had had for Richard quickly evaporated.

With a twelve month plan completed, Tim and I presented this to our finance company and visited every one of our key suppliers to explain the current situation and to present our plans.  Luckily, we gained the full support of everyone.  Tim proceeded to do a remarkable job as the new MD, working tirelessly to rally the whole team, whilst I started the process of seeking a new finance director. With the aid of our VC, we quickly met and appointed a very experienced FD who quickly set about bringing the company’s books up to the required standard.  With the correct information guiding us, and the whole team working effectively, sales and margins slowly started to improve.

By mid year (our second) we were trading profitably but cash remained as tight as ever.  Further close examination revealed that our finance company were slowly but surely reeling in their loan by reducing their advances against our invoices.  It was galling in an extreme to realise that, had we not had the actions of the vendor and his illicit cash strip, we would have been in a healthy cash position with no liquidity concerns. However, with Offhand (the vendor) again doing a disappearing act at my latest attempt to arrange a dispute resolution meeting, it was clear that we were running out of time before we had to go to court.  Although we were sure of the odds of winning on our main claim (the cash strip), there was unfortunately (due to the poor state of the books before our purchase) a degree of uncertainty over the smaller claim.  With the prospect of enormous legal bills even if we won the main claim, it was clear that drastic action was needed.  My first foray into business ownership looked like it could hit the rocks.

With the business trading in two entirely separate markets, with two different product ranges, it was apparent that, potentially, we could package one half of the business and sell this to a competitor.  One of the product ranges had lower margins and poorer quality debtors but had potentially a higher strategic value to competition.  With a range of cautious estimates for a sale price, it became clear that the rump business, operating with lower overheads, could prosper even without the reducing invoice discounting facility.

I initiated a series of discrete discussions with our competition for the more saleable business. My approach was based on the premise that having recently acquired Riverbridge, I was conducting a exploratory review to ascertain if we should either expand the business by acquisition of a suitable competitor (were they interested in selling) or to dispose of one business to concentrate on the other (were they interested in acquisition).  Two such meetings sparked interest that I progressed leading me to believe that we could achieve a price at the upper end of our estimates.   Nevertheless, whilst we were now trading profitably, we were far from being out of the woods in terms of liquidity and whilst in this situation we lacked the cash to pursue the legal action. I drove the long way back home that week convinced we could make the plan work.

Given the somewhat vague legal definition of insolvency, I wanted to be sure that we were on safe ground selling off company assets and sought specialist advice from one of the big four accountancy firms.  It transpired that to be certain that we were seen to be acting in the best interests of all the creditors, we needed to advise them of our plans and gain their agreement.  As I was returning from the meeting I received a call from one of the two interested parties advising me that they were withdrawing.  This robbed me of the opportunity to have two parties bidding against each other but all you need is one willing purchaser; so, press on.  When I got back to the office I found that sales in the previous month had failed to reach our projection.  Immediately, the finance company reduced advances against our invoices still further.

Good news came at last in the form of an encouraging offer for the part of the business we had put up for sale.  We only now needed to gain the agreement of our creditors to a new overall plan, realise the sale at the agreed sum and we were home and dry.  We would be able to pay off all overdue creditors and finance court proceedings against Offhand.  We carefully revised our rolling twelve month business plan and Tim & I started the arduous task of again travelling the country to meet our creditors.  The full story we presented included a fall back position (if the sale failed or we did not receive the full backing of all creditors) of having to place the business into administration.  In the event, we achieved 100% acceptance of our plan but to no avail.

The hammer blow came several days later, when I received a call from the CEO of the competitor that had made the offer; he had heard of the precarious state of the overall business and was withdrawing his offer. It subsequently transpired that the credit control manager of our largest supplier (who had pledged full support to me) had revealed our situation to our competitor. We discussed the situation as a board but there was no way out; with the working capital financing now almost depleted (and soon to disappear completely) and no way of raising further finance to continue trading and fight our legal case we had run out of road.  The same day I appointed the firm I had met as administrators and arranged to meet them at the office the following morning.

Over the next 24 hours I was relieved of my duties as an employee and director.  Tim was kept on for a few weeks more whilst the administrators tried to sell the business as a going concern.  The part of the business we had originally received a healthy offer for went as an asset sale for a fraction of its worth immediately prior to the administration.  I lost a great deal of money and the creditors never received a penny.  Our wonderful administrators then managed to string the process out for ten whole years and took everything they raised in fees.

What had I learnt from all this?

Without a shadow of a doubt, we were robbed by our vendor.  When making an acquisition you can have all the guarantees and indemnities you and your lawyers can negotiate but you still take a hell of a risk.  Fighting legal claims is a very expensive process.  The only satisfaction I got was hearing some years later that Offhand’s mistress threw him over and his wife divorced him, winning most of his ill-gotten gains.

The references that had been obtained for Richard had been a fairy tale; I discovered that he had run a prior business into the ground in similar fashion.  Over the years I’ve found that references are frequently a waste of time, or at least, it’s not what people say that counts it’s the bits they leave out.

If our experience of appointing one of the big four firms is typical, the administration process does not seem to work in favour of the creditors.  Without exaggerating, I’d say we (and our creditors) were robbed on the way out as well as on the way in to this business.

Tim went on to form his own business and last heard was making a very good job of it.  Of all the people I’ve worked with, Tim ranks amongst the very best.  All of the team who worked with us through those trying months did their best; I only wish for their sakes we could have pulled it off.

Had I made horrendous mistakes? I could blame myself but apart from believing in Richard and supporting the acquisition in the first place, I think I made the appropriate decisions in a timely fashion.

 Yes, if you throw enough hot c**p at a blanket some of it will stick.  Shortly after acquiring Bridgestream my favourite VC and I did two more deals; one soon looked like it was also heading to the graveyard when we uncovered a horrendous loss and the other quickly threw up a very bad case of fraud (and years of legal fees).  These are tales for another day but I did learn to multitask as both of these situations occurred at the same time as Bridgestream!

Bye for now!

Image courtesy of seasonsofthemoon.com